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[Dear Schmooze participants, 
This is a condensed version of a longer piece that I’m currently working on. The longer piece is 
intended for an audience of political theorists and political scientists, and as such discusses the 
legal doctrine of campaign finance in much more extensive detail than is necessary for a legal 
audience. I thus hope that you will excuse the superfluity in some of what follows. I eagerly look 




Why Campaign Finance Matters 
Prithviraj Datta 
Due to the combination of a host of factors – not least among them being the Supreme 
Court decision in the case of Citizens United v FEC, the not-entirely-unrelated explosion of 
Super PACs as a political force in electoral politics, and the tremendous increase in the amounts 
that candidates and parties have been spending in their campaign efforts – the issue of campaign 
finance has, once again, rise to prominence in scholarly and public debate. Unsurprisingly, given 
the highly polarized and divisive political environment in which we live, the debate over 
campaign finance is characterized by a sharp cleavage of opinion regarding the normative 
desirability of the legal regime that governs campaign spending in the United States currently. 
Yet, in spite of this renewal of interest, the debate is shaped almost entirely by two conceptions 
of the normative significance of campaign finance which are themselves quite old, having been 
developed in the course of prior eruptions of concern over the manner in which American 
campaigns were funded and run. In the course of the account which follows, I will endeavor to 
demonstrate that these conceptions of the salience of campaign spending – which I term the 
“informational” and the “influence-based” conceptions respectively – suffer from serious 
empirical and conceptual infirmities. To the extent that participants in the debate over the 
desirability of the current campaign spending regime rely on these conceptions, therefore, the 
arguments that they put forth rest on an unsound and unstable footing. A more empirically valid 
and conceptually nuanced discussion of the merits of the contemporary campaign finance regime 
is possible, however, if one regards campaign finance as being important not by virtue of the role 
it plays in informing citizens, or enabling them to exercise greater political influence, but rather, 
for the manner in which it permits those who engage in it to obtain affirmation for their political 
preferences. The primary aim of this account, therefore, is to provide an outline of this 
affirmational case for the democratic importance of campaign finance. Before commencing with 
the provision of this outline, however, it is first necessary to take up the informational conception 
of campaign finance for critique and analysis. 
The Informational Conception of Campaign Finance 
 The most succinct – and perhaps best known – articulation of the informational 
conception may be in found in Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the United States 
Supreme Court in the decision of Citizens United v Federal Election Commission. Citizens 
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United involved a challenge to the constitutionality of restrictions on the broadcast of 
“electioneering communications” funded by corporations or labor unions in the run-up to a 
primary, or general election, for federal office. An “electioneering communication,” as defined 
by the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, referred to any broadcast communication 
which was made 30 days before a contested primary or 60 days prior to a federal election, 
referred to a candidate by name, and was targeted at the public. Citizens United was a non-profit 
corporation which sought to broadcast a feature critical of Hillary Clinton, then a candidate for 
the Democratic Presidential nomination, within the 30-day window prior to the first Democratic 
primaries for the 2008 election. As such, the broadcast fell squarely within BCRA’s restriction 
on electioneering communications. Aggrieved by the possibility of sanction for broadcasting the 
documentary it produced, Citizens United moved the courts for relief, arguing, among other 
grounds, that BCRA’s restrictions on electioneering communications violated its constitutional 
right to the freedom of speech. In its final decision, following an unusual second round of 
arguments, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court agreed with Citizens United. In his opinion 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy reasoned that the restrictions were problematic because they 
deprived  
“the electorate…of information, knowledge and opinion vital to its function. By suppressing the 
speech of manifold corporations, both profit and non-profit, the Government prevents their 
voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons and 
entities are hostile to their interests.”1 
Since the protection of the “the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among 
candidates for office” was one of the foremost tasks of the United States Constitution’s 
protection for the freedom of speech, Kennedy further concluded, these restrictions were also 
unconstitutional, as were any forms of campaign finance limitations other than those aimed at 
overcoming quid pro quo corruption, and enhancing the disclosure of the identities of those 
engaged in campaign spending.
2
 
  Justice Kennedy’s treatment of campaign finance follows in a long line of judicial 
decisions which treat such spending as a form of speech, and which regard the electoral sphere as 
a “marketplace of ideas” entitled to heightened protection from governmental regulation.3 On 
this view, campaign spending, in the first instance, enables individuals to engage in the 
dissemination of their beliefs to the public at large at a period when the public’s attention to 
issues of political significance is at its highest. Campaign spending, in this regard, enables 
individuals to engage in the process of persuading their fellow citizens of the merits of the 
positions, candidates, and parties whom they support. The importance of such efforts aimed at 
persuasion, however, emerges from the impact that they have upon those who are exposed to 
them, rather than from the benefits which accrue to those engaging in them. Where the members 
of the public are confronted by a diversity of political arguments, each urging them to take a 
different course of action on the day of the elections, this account further proceeds, they are 
encouraged to reflect upon the competing arguments before them, and to follow the one which 
                                                 
1
 Citizens United v Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010).  
2
 Ibid., 898. 
3
 See, for e.g., Buckley v Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); and First National Bank v Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).  
3 
they find most convincing on its merits. The true democratic value of campaign finance, it thus 
follows, emerges from the manner in which it enables citizens to engage in the reasoned 
evaluation of the candidates and parties before them, thereby enhancing the quality of their 
electoral decisions, and, by implication, of their government as well.
4
 
 There are thus two assumptions which underpin the informational conception of the 
importance of campaign finance. The first is that campaigns matter; that is to say, that citizens 
pay attention to the views and positions to which they are exposed in the period immediately 
preceding elections, and that campaign messages play a role in the electoral decisions that they 
make. Secondly, it must also be the case, as a matter of fact, that campaign spending prompts 
reasoned evaluation for the informational conception to be an accurate description of the 
importance of campaigns. The veracity of the informational conception hinges, in other words, 
on its being true that the electoral messages that campaign spending funds either be intended as a 
means of encouraging those exposed to it to engage in scrutinizing the positions of the 
candidates and parties running for office on matters of collective political importance and relying 
upon the results of their investigations to make their voting decisions, or that it have the effect of 
doing so. Regrettably, however, all that we know about the realities of the modern American 
electoral campaign indicates that there is very little warrant for believing that these assumptions 
are true. 
There are two sets of findings, in this regard, which are pertinent to highlight. Thus, in 
the first instance, several political scientists have argued that voters largely decide whom to vote 
for on the basis of pre-determined partisan affiliations, and that the information that they receive 
during campaigns which run counter to these affiliations are often ignored.
5
 Furthermore, while a 
large – and increasing – number of citizens declare themselves to be “independent,” and eschew 
formal affiliation with any particular political party, partisan affiliations have been found to 
dictate the voting behavior of a majority of these formally unattached citizens as well.
6
 If these 
accounts are correct, we have good reason to believe that campaigns play a role in determining 
the political views of a very small minority of citizens. Secondly, and more prominently, there is 
an overwhelming amount of evidence that political scientists have adduced to support their 
contention that fundamental issues over which campaigns have little to no control, and indeed 
which are often determined prior to the process of campaigning, play perhaps the most decisive 
role in determining electoral outcomes.
7
 Thus, political scientists who study American politics 
have had a considerable degree of success in predicting electoral outcomes well before the 
campaign process gets fully underway, chiefly by focusing on public perceptions of the health of 
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the economy, and the state of the nation’s security.8 Taken cumulatively, therefore, these sets of 
findings have led many political scientists to assert that electoral campaigns have limited effects 
on determining political outcomes, and usually play only a small role in transforming the 
political views that citizens hold. If this account is correct, it thus follows, efforts to defend 
campaigns for the role that they play in informing citizens and enabling them to better identify 
their political interests have no foundations in political reality.  
 The “minimal effects” school of thought has, it is important to concede, come in for 
serious challenge in recent times, with several political scientists arguing that campaigns do, in 
fact, have an impact on the decisions that voters make during elections. There is little in the 
findings of these revisionist accounts, however, which supports Kennedy’s endorsement of 
campaign finance as a means by which citizens may be prompted to reason about their political 
interests, and help them attain a “consensus” on political issues as a result. Rather, to the extent 
that campaigns do appear to have an effect on individuals, their impact may be attributed to the 
prompting of spontaneous and irrational responses from those who are exposed to them. Thus, 
while proponents of the “campaign effects” approach have found that exposure to campaigns, 
and their messaging, can prompt citizens to change their minds, these persuasive effects are 
usually felt by a small section of voters – those “persuadable partisans” who have traditionally 
voted for a particular party or platform, and since become dissatisfied with them. For these 
citizens, therefore, campaigns only provide the final push that convinces them to change their 
vote, and do not themselves occasion the sort of deep reflection that precedes a switch in partisan 
political affiliation.
9
 Furthermore, the role that campaigns play in persuading voters to change 
their minds largely occurs through the priming of affective and emotional responses from these 
citizens. When exposure to campaign messaging convinces voters, in other words, to change 
their voting behavior, they do so not by prompting a reasoned re-evaluation of their political 
preferences, but, rather, by playing on their sentiments to provoke feelings of enthusiasm for 
certain candidates, or of fear and resentment towards others.
10
 As one account succinctly puts it, 
campaigns serve as vehicles by which to disseminate “propaganda that are successful in causing 
citizens to shift their expressed preferences toward the sponsoring candidate,” and not by causing 
them to bring their enlightened interests in line with their voting decisions.
11
 There is thus also 
little empirical evidence to support the contention that campaign spending is intended as, or has 
the effect of, prompting reasoned evaluation on the part of those targeted by the messages that it 
funds.  
 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any set of conditions under which campaigns could 
perform the function of occasioning reasoning about political preferences of the sort Kennedy 
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envisages in his opinion for the majority in Citizens United. The purpose of campaigns, after all, 
is to secure electoral victory for certain key political entities – parties, candidates, or electoral 
platforms – and to do little else. The obsessive focus on electoral success turns campaigning into 
what Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have termed a “competitive, zero-sum activity” in 
which “[d]efeating your adversary is the dominant and legitimate motive.”12 Under these sorts of 
constraints and incentive structures, it is difficult to imagine campaign finance ever supporting 
the forms of expression which provoke citizens to carefully reconsider and reevaluate the beliefs 
and preferences that they subscribe to in the light of alternate, reasoned viewpoints. Rather, the 
imperatives of ensuring electoral victory are almost always likely to compel the organizers of 
campaigns to fund messaging and activities which provoke emotional responses in citizens, since 
emotional appeals have a greater likelihood of occasioning a change in voting behavior than the 
reasoned and rational interchange of ideas in the electoral arena would.  
Campaign Finance as Political Influence 
 The most prominent competitor to the informational conception of the normative salience 
of campaign finance treats it as a form of political influence. On influence-based accounts, 
campaign spending is an important means by which citizens can gain the attention of their 
elected officials and political leaders, thereby enabling them to secure political outcomes which 
they favor. The logic of this argument is not difficult to understand. Money may, without much 
exaggeration, be regarded as the life-blood of competitive electoral campaigns, especially in in 
countries as large and as heavily populated as the United States where voter outreach and 
mobilization can only be effectively undertaken at considerable expense. When citizens donate 
to competitive campaigns, therefore, they satisfy a voracious need that candidates and parties 
have. Spending which helps to meet this insatiable demand for money can thus inspire feelings 
of gratitude on the part of those who benefit from it, and one may reasonably expect such 
gratitude, in turn, to be repaid through the enactment or promulgation of favorable policy 
outcomes when their beneficiaries win their electoral contests and assume office.13 On the 
influence-based conception, campaign spending, in this sense, thus serves as an important – if 
not the most important – input into what the campaign finance scholar Larry Lessig has called 




 Proponents of the influence-based conception, however, also encounter serious obstacles 
to their arguments. The first of these emerges from the lack of any compelling empirical 
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evidence that demonstrates that campaign spending has an impact on political outcomes. Thus, in 
a seminal article titled “Why is There So Little Money in Politics?”, the political economists 
Stephen Ansolabehere, James de Figueiredo and James Snyder offer a bevy of reasons to doubt 
that campaign giving is motivated by the desire to exercise influence, and to believe that any 
giving which is so motivated would in fact be a wasted investment. The authors of this article 
begin their account by noting a peculiar feature of campaign spending in the United States: while 
the sums that are spent on funding candidates and parties during federal elections are large in 
absolute dollar terms, they form an infinitesimally small fraction of the total amount that is spent 
by the federal government. Additionally, they observe that a large number of wealthy 
organizations which have an interest in securing favorable political outcomes – corporations and 
labor unions, for instance – do not spent on campaigns at all, or spend very little, nowhere near 
the limits which electoral law imposes on campaign contributions and expenditures.
15
 The 
relative indifference that these organized political actors display towards campaign spending thus 
provides us with one preliminary reason to doubt whether spending of this nature does, in fact, 
have an impact on political outcomes. Ansolabehere, de Figueiredo and Snyder also sought to 
provide an explanation for why this unwillingness on the part of well-funded interests was not 
merely a form of over-cautious or otherwise irrational behavior. They did this by undertaking a 
meta-analysis of over 40 studies which were aimed at determining whether campaign 
contributions could effectively predict roll-call votes cast by members of Congress, as a means 
of further determining if contributions had an influence on legislative outcomes. Based on this 
meta-analysis, these scholars concluded that there was almost no evidence to suggest that 
campaign contributions had any independent impact upon legislative outcomes. “Legislators’ 
votes,” they noted, “depend almost entirely upon their beliefs and the preferences of their voters 
and their party.”16 The relative lack of interest that the wealthy and the well-mobilized displayed 
in campaign spending is thus, in light of its minimal effects, entirely rational on their account. 
 In the years since its publication, several doubts have been raised about the accuracy of 
the conclusions in “Why is There So Little Money in Politics?” None of these doubts, however, 
have tested the fundamental assertion at the core of the article – that campaign finance is a poor 
means of exerting influence over political outcomes. Thus, while some scholars have questioned 
the accuracy of the meta-analysis undertaken by the authors of the article in the years following 
its publication,
17
 most political economists tend to agree with its finding that legislative 
outcomes are not directly dictated by campaign spending.
18
 Most recent influence-based 
accounts, however, have moved away from arguing that campaign contributions make an impact 
upon the votes of legislators to arguing, instead, that they play a crucial role in determining who 
gains access to legislators, policy-makers, and other actors in positions of political authority. 
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Campaign contributions, it is commonly asserted on this access-oriented version of the 
influence-based conception, serve as important vehicles by means of which lobbyists are able to 
win political concessions for the interests that back them, most prominently by enabling them to 
engage in a strategy of “buying time” of legislators.19 When lobbyists marshal campaign 
contributions towards legislators, in other words, they provide incentives to these officials to 
grant them an audience where they can present the concerns and views of those whom they 
represent. Since the time and attention of legislators is finite, it is feared that campaign 
contributions purchase access for the wealthy at the expense of those who lack the resources to 
engage in campaign spending and to hire lobbyists. In this way, the argument goes, unrestricted 
campaign spending greatly restricts the range of views and voices that legislators are exposed to 
in the course of discharging their functions of legislative agenda-setting and policy-making, 
thereby conferring the wealthy and the well-connected a disproportionate amount of influence 
over political outcomes.
20
 Campaign spending, in other words, enables lobbyists to undertake 
what is termed an “exchange” strategy, where contributions are granted (or channeled) either as a 
bid for the granting of legislative time and attention, or as a reward for the same.
21
 
 The trouble with these access-based arguments for treating campaign finance as a form of 
political influence, however, is that they are contradicted by the funding practices of 
contemporary lobbyists. To put this point somewhat differently, if the exchange strategy for 
purchasing access – and hence, exercising influence – were prevalent, one would expect 
lobbyists to direct most of their resources towards legislators who either took positions that were 
opposed to their interests, or at least towards those who were ambivalent “fence-sitters” on issues 
of significance to the interests that they represented. Surprisingly, however, the facts that we 
have at our disposal about the habits of lobbyists indicate exactly the opposite: lobbyists tend to 
concentrate the majority of their spending upon officials who are already ideologically allied 
with them, and with whom they enjoy pre-existing relationships.
22
 The problem that this feature 
of the practice of lobbying poses for the exchange strategy is obvious: it seems to indicate that 
lobbyists expend huge sums of money – in the billions of dollars annually – to gain access to, 
and hence to attempt to influence, those legislators whose interests and commitments are similar 
to theirs, and who have a considerable degree of sympathy for the positions that they espouse. It 
is difficult to regard such a strategy as being rational in any sense, and to understand why 
lobbyists would be supported in such an endeavor by those who hire them. 
 These facts about the funding practices of lobbyists have prompted contemporary 
political scientists to, for the most part, abandon access-based analyses of lobbying. Instead of 
treating lobbyists as putative purchasers of access, scholars of politics now prefer to regard 
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lobbyists as “information service bureaus,”23 or as providing a “legislative subsidy.”24 On this 
view, the primary role that lobbyists perform is of providing legislators with information that is 
relevant to the performance of their jobs. There are three kinds of information, in particular, 
which legislators look to lobbyists to obtain. The first is information of a technical or complex 
nature which legislators do not have the skills or resources to obtain and understand on their 
own.
25
 Secondly, lobbyists can also make information about legislative strategy accessible to 
legislators, leveraging their political connections to provide elected officials with details about 
the policy preferences of other legislators, as well as of the procedural obstacles that lie in the 
way of achieving political outcomes that they favor. Lobbyists, in the words of the political 
economists Richard Hall and Alan Deardorff, thus provide crucial “political intelligence” to 
those whom they support and engage with.
26
 Finally, lobbyists can also provide legislators with 
information about the views and preferences of their constituents. The importance of lobbyists, 
in this regard, emerges from the manner in which they can assist legislators to align their policy 
interests with their electoral interests.
27
 It is pertinent to point out, in this regard, that legislators 
are more likely to trust, and hence to rely upon, information provided to them by lobbyists with 
whom they are closely affiliated and share common political ground. 
  It is important to note that while political scientists focus on the informational role that 
lobbyists play in contemporary politics, they also take great care to emphasize that the 
information that is provided to legislators is far from innocuous, and often – if not always – 
filtered through the strategic preferences and biases that these lobbyists hold. By controlling 
what information is made available to legislators, and how it is conveyed, therefore, lobbyists are 
able to determine legislative outcomes in a manner that benefits the interests of those whom they 
represent – usually the wealthy or the well-connected – at the expense of the less well-off and the 
poorly mobilized.
28
 For the purpose of the present account, however, it is important to note that 
campaign finance only plays a limited role in determining political outcomes through the 
provision of political information in this form. Thus, engaging in campaign spending can allow 
new entrants into the lobbying field to establish their credentials and signal their political 
affiliations by establishing patterns of political giving along ideological and partisan lines. 
Additionally, where lobbyists continue to raise and spend large sums of money for those with 
whom they are already aligned, they also continue to signal their commitment and interest to 
those politicians who benefit from such giving. Campaign contributions, it thus follows, may 
smooth the way for lobbyists to access legislators, but they are not, in and of themselves, the 
chief source through which lobbyists impact political outcomes. Such impact emerges from the 
informational services that lobbyists provide to these legislators – services in which, it bears 
reiterating, campaign spending plays no role. To the extent that campaign spending does provide 
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access to legislators, therefore, it does so in a manner that does not necessarily confer influence 
in way that proponents of the exchange model allege it does. 
 It is relevant to note, furthermore, that contributions form only one way – and a marginal 
one, at that – in which relationships can be established and maintained between lobbyists and 
elected officials. Indeed, political observers often argue that employing individuals who are close 
to legislators, or those with considerable policy expertise, is a more effective way of building 
political ties with legislators than engaging in campaign spending.
29
 From an informational 
standpoint, this makes a good deal of sense: lobbyists who hire their former staffers are more 
successfully able to establish their reliability, ideological affinity and trustworthiness by 
leveraging the sort of personal connections that the mere making of campaign contributions is 
unable to nurture. Contributions thus appear to matter only at the periphery even in providing 
access, casting further doubt on the belief that the exchange strategy is widely resorted to by 
lobbyists as means of securing political outcomes that favor those whom they represent. It 
follows, from the foregoing discussion, that the imposition of strict limits on campaign spending 
is unlikely to bring about a reduction in the asymmetric nature in which political influence is 
currently distributed in the United States. Those concerned with mitigating the stranglehold that 
the wealthy and the well-connected exercise over the political process – a grip that is all too real 
and well-documented – would thus do better if they turned their attention to reforming means of 
political participation other than campaign finance. For those seeking to understand how 
campaign finance works, and what the source of its political importance is, however, the search 
for a conceptually sound and empirically plausible theory of campaign spending still continues. 
It is time, therefore, to turn to providing the outlines of exactly one such account of campaign 
finance, which treats it as an important means by which citizens may obtain affirmation for their 
political preferences. 
Campaign Finance and the Affirmation of Political Preferences 
 Before proceeding with discussing how campaign finance enables those who engage in it 
to obtain the affirmation of their political preferences, it is necessary, as a preliminary matter, to 
spend a little time on understanding the role that elections play in conferring legitimacy upon the 
political positions taken by those who win them, as well as of their supporters, endorsers, and 
funders. Electoral outcomes hold a particularly exalted status in the democratic imagination. 
Where an electoral platform gains victory, the candidates and parties running on it, as well as 
their supporters, are able to plausibly assert a mandate for the issues and policy positions which 
comprise that platform, even though the supposed public consent for such a mandate is usually 
hypothetical and constructed, rather than being an actual sociological fact.
30
 The claiming of 
such a mandate serves two purposes: one which is primarily administrative in nature, and the 
other being chiefly moral in its emphasis. In the first instance, electoral victory creates a 
presumption – albeit a rebuttable one – in favor of the validity and desirability of political 
decision-making which furthers the campaign promises that were made by those parties, 
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candidates, and coalitions who form the government upon the completion of elections. We see 
this, for instance, in some the arguments that Barack Obama and Congressional Democrats 
offered for prioritizing the comprehensive reform of the American healthcare system in the face 
of concerted opposition from Republicans, and the demands that the prolonged economic 
recession was making on legislative time and attention. Since healthcare reform, the argument 
went, was a core component of the Democratic Party’s platform, as well as a major issue on the 
campaign agenda in the Presidential election of 2008, efforts to overhaul the American health 
care system were to be regarded as presumptively valid, as electoral victories for the President, 
and for the Democrats who formed a majority in Congress, could reasonably be interpreted as 
conferring a popular mandate for such an outcome. 
 The second, and for our purposes, more important, role that electoral victory serves is to 
allow the supporters of winning platforms to claim legitimacy for those political positions and 
beliefs to which they attach salience. The chief impact of electoral success, in this context, is not 
the momentum that it generates for particular legislative outcomes, but rather, the enhancement 
in moral valence that accrues to issues that form part of the agenda on the basis of which 
campaigns are fought. The legitimating effect of electoral victory was captured most evocatively 
by Tocqueville, when he discussed the reactions that impending Presidential elections had upon 
political parties in Jacksonian America. Ordinarily content to remain aloof from the public, 
Tocqueville observed, parties felt a great need, during the run-up to elections, 
“to rally around an individual in order to communicate more effectively with the masses. Thus 
they generally use the name of the Presidential candidate as a symbol: they make him the 
personification of their theories. Hence the parties have a great interest in winning Presidential 
elections, not so much in order to aid in achieving the triumph of their doctrines as to 
demonstrate by electing him that those doctrines enjoy the support of the majority.”31 
While Tocqueville does not explicitly articulate what it is about majority support for a party’s 
“doctrines” which make electoral victory so vital, the reasons are fairly obvious. Electoral 
victory allows winning parties to claim that their views and positions are more democratically 
legitimate than – and hence, normatively superior to – parties on the losing side. This claim is, of 
course, a rebuttable one, since electoral victory is not the only factor determinative of democratic 
legitimacy. As the political theorist Russell Muirhead validly notes, the fact “that the numerous 
have some claim is not to say that its claim is absolute, or trumps every other claim. It is rather 
one ingredient in the mix of democratic legitimacy.”32 Nevertheless, in the absence of 
compelling moral flaws pervading the positions which parties in government take on the 
campaign trail, or of reasons which call the fairness of the electoral process into question, 
electoral victory adds significant rhetorical force to claims of greater moral worth when they are 
made by winning parties. While the fundamental issues at stake in contemporary elections rarely 
pack the same sort of moral punch that those in antebellum America did, the legitimacy-
conferring role that elections play upon the political preferences of those who ally themselves 
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with particular candidates nevertheless continues to serve as an important motor of electoral 
mobilization and participation in our time as well. 
 While Tocqueville’s discussion is limited to parties, it does not take much imagination to 
see how electoral success can also have a similarly legitimating effect upon the preferences to 
which individuals attach salience. Where citizens ally themselves closely with a particular party 
or candidate – in other words, act in a partisan manner – and where that party or candidate 
secures electoral victory, these citizens too may rely on this outcome to claim greater democratic 
legitimacy for the preferences which they share with it. Campaign contributions, in particular, 
can play an extremely prominent role in conferring legitimacy upon the political views that 
partisans adhere to. They can serve the instrumental purpose of enabling their beneficiaries to 
secure electoral victory, by underwriting the expenses necessary to motivate the public to take a 
sympathetic view of their proposals, and to mobilize them to turn out in their support during the 
elections. Contributions, in this way, allow those making them to take ownership of the electoral 
victories of the candidates and parties whom they support. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, where citizens donate funds to candidates or parties, they make it possible for these 
entities to disseminate their ideas – and, by extension, the ideas of their partisan supporters – to 
the public at large. Where the beneficiaries of such partisan spending gain electoral victory, they 
allow their donors to claim that their views, and not those of partisans on the losing side, have 
been heard by their fellow citizens, and found to be convincing by them. These claims may, as I 
have noted above, be adduced in support of arguments which seek to establish the pro tanto 
validity of legislation favored exclusively by partisans of those in the winning coalition, but they 
may also be presented to underpin the normative desirability of the positions that these partisans 
take. In so doing, one may argue, campaign contributions can have the effect of affirming the 
political preferences that partisans hold, where the beneficiaries of such contributions are able to 
secure electoral victory.
 
 It is important to note, at this point, that while the obtaining of electoral success is 
perhaps the most effective way by means of which campaign spenders are able to gain 
legitimacy (and hence, affirmation) for their political preferences, the pursuit of electoral victory 
through such spending can also have similar effects. Thus, where citizens engage in campaign 
spending, they may be able to obtain the same sort of affirmation of their political preferences as 
arises when individuals are able to secure a public hearing for their views. Where citizens are 
allowed and encouraged to support political causes and entities in furtherance of their beliefs 
without fearing reprisal or coercion, they may come to internalize the belief that these viewpoints 
are important. The display of toleration and restraint on the part of the legal system, and of those 
exposed to the views that campaign spending funds, in other words, can engender respect and 
regard for these views among those who hold them.
33
 Secondly, campaign spending may also 
result in the affirmation of political preferences by generating relationships of solidarity among 
funders. Here campaign spending is conducted in a transparent and open manner, citizens who 
contribute to a favored party, candidate, or cause are able to see that their views are not held in 
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isolation, and that a portion of their fellow-citizens are also committed to the same views and 
preferences that animate them. The recognition that political beliefs are shared by others can also 
serve as a powerful source of affirmation of those beliefs. It demonstrates to those individuals 
holding these views that they are not mistaken or misled in the degree of significance which they 
attach to their political preferences, since many of their peers feel as strongly about the relevant 
political issues as they do.
34
 Finally, campaign spending can also lead to the affirmation of 
political preferences by occasioning contestation among citizens who are exposed to campaign 
messaging which they disagree with, or otherwise find objectionable. Where citizens are able to 
respond to these messages by engaging in messaging of their own, thereby engaging in a robust 
defense of their own preferences and beliefs, they may find themselves taking their own political 
views more seriously, and according a higher level of regard to them as a result.
35
 
 The argument that campaign spending secures the affirmation of political preferences 
avoids many of the pitfalls identified with the influence-based conception of campaign finance. 
For starters, attributing an affirmational role to such spending offers us a convincing explanation 
for why donors continue to spend large sums of money to support candidates and make 
independent expenditures despite the limited influence that such expenditures exercise upon 
political outcomes which they favor. Campaign spending, for these individuals, can be regarded 
as a means of standing with parties and candidates whom they identify with, or of ensuring the 
dissemination of the political views that they favor, in an attempt to gain affirmation for one’s 
beliefs. The large sums that they spend on candidates and outcomes which they favor, therefore, 
ought not to be regarded as an irrational pursuit of influence, but, rather, as a means of engaging 
in self-expression. It is important to note, however, that there is little in the way of 
incontrovertible evidence available to us (yet) to demonstrate that most campaign spending is, in 
fact, driven by the desire to obtain the affirmation of political preferences in the manner 
highlighted above. Unfortunately, scholars who study campaign participation have only paid 
limited attention to understanding the motivations that underpin spending on the part of 
campaign donors. It is possible, however, to produce some indirect support for the foregoing 
argument by noting the manner in which it can satisfactorily explain a peculiar feature of the 
American campaign finance system: the widespread and increasing levels of engagement in 
campaign spending on the part of ordinary donors; that is, of individuals who give less than 
$1,000 to candidates and as independent expenditures in any election cycle.
36
 As recent surveys 
show, cumulative donations in the amount of $1,000 or less have been increasing at an extremely 
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fast pace in recent federal elections.
37
 The informational model, focused as it is on the effects of 
spending rather than upon its causes, is unable to provide a satisfactory explanation for why such 
spending occurs. Indeed, given the extremely high costs associated with purchasing airtime and 
engaging in other forms of campaign mobilization, it is unlikely that donors who give in small 
amounts believe that their contributions will have an impact on the nature and amount of 
information available to the public on the eve of the elections. This is especially unlikely to be 
the case in light of the (well-known) fact that parties, candidates, and independent expenditure 
committees raise most of their funds from large donors and entrenched interest groups, rather 
than from ordinary donors. Nor can the influence-based conception offer a full explanation for 
the increasing presence of ordinary donors in American campaigns. Given the huge sums that 
large donors and special interests make available to parties and candidates during elections, it 
would be entirely unreasonable for an individual who spends $1,000 or thereabouts, and who has 
no other means of obtaining access to elected officials, to expect to influence political decision-
making by means of her contribution. 
 The affirming effects argument put forth in this account offers us a better explanation for 
why small donors – despite the widespread cynicism that Americans display towards electoral 
politics in general, and campaign finance in particular – are resorting to campaign spending in 
ever-increasing numbers. Campaign donations allow these individuals to purse legitimacy for 
their political preferences by contributing, however modestly, to the electoral success of the 
parties and candidates whom they identify with politically, or who take congruent positions on 
political issues to which they attach salience; campaign spending, for them, is thus akin to 
volunteering time for political canvassing and other forms of mobilization efforts. Such 
spending, in other words, serves as a means by which partisans and issue advocates can dedicate 
the resources at their disposal to ensuring that their “side,” or the political positions which they 
support, obtains popular approval at the hustings. It is this desire to obtain electoral legitimacy 
for their preferences which explains why ordinary donors respond with alacrity to fundraising 
messages that specifically target them. As scholars of political spending have noted, ordinary 
donor involvement in campaign funding is strongly correlated with efforts on the part of 
candidates and parties, and to a lesser extent, of issue and advocacy groups, to solicit funds from 
such individuals.
38
 These fundraising messages signal financial need on the part of those who 
issue them, and are often couched in terms which predict detrimental political consequences 
which are likely to arise if they are not heeded. In this way, fundraising solicitation motivates 
partisan supporters and issue advocates to step up their spending efforts, in a bid secure electoral 
legitimacy for the political positions that they share with those sending them these messages, or, 
as is often the case, to prevent those politically opposed to them from obtaining electoral 
approval for their views and preferences.  
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The ancillary affirming effects of campaign spending – its impact on developing greater 
regard for the preferences that campaign donors hold by conferring recognition, engendering 
solidarity, or occasioning contestation – helps us understand another peculiar feature of 
campaign spending in the American context: the disproportionate role that donors who hold 
strong and politically intense views which are located outside the political mainstream play in the 
making of small contributions.
39
 The importance of campaign spending for these ideological 
“extremists” cannot be attributed to the role that electoral success plays in affirming their 
political preferences. Those ordinary donors who give their hard-earned money to the Libertarian 
Party, or in support of Dennis Kucinich’s efforts to win the Democratic Presidential primary, 
after all, are fully aware of the futility of such spending as a means of helping their beneficiaries 
secure office. For these individuals, then, campaign spending is best understood as a means by 
which to obtain affirmation for their political preferences in the three distinct ways that I have 
identified above. In the first instance, by enabling the dissemination of views that they regard as 
important to the public at large, those citizens who adhere to preferences that lie outside the 
political mainstream are able to gain a greater regard for their beliefs. Additionally, by allowing 
these individuals to join in common cause with other citizens who share their preferences, and 
who are committed enough to them to spend their precious money on candidates and platforms 
furthering them, campaign spending may heighten the respect that they accord to their political 
positions by engendering solidarity. Finally, spending which supports “extremist” candidates and 
platforms can also help those who incur it to stand in opposition to the positions taken by more 
mainstream political actors. In so doing, it may serve to enhance the attachment and regard 
which they have towards their own political preferences, by allowing them to contest and 
challenge those views which they regard as problematic. 
 It is not too difficult to appreciate the appeal of campaign spending, when understood as 
furthering the affirmation of political preferences, in light of the foregoing examples. While 
campaign finance may not contribute to the creation of a more enlightened citizenry, and may 
not occasion greater responsiveness on the part of political leaders towards the concerns of those 
who spend to get them elected, it nevertheless continues to have considerable democratic 
importance and valence. Thus, in the first instance, by enabling individuals to obtain democratic 
legitimacy for their political preferences along the lines described above, campaign spending can 
create a deeper appreciation and regard for democratic politics among those who resort to it. 
Increasing participation in campaign spending may thus serve as one important means – though 
by no means the exclusive one – by which to counteract the widespread prevalence of apathy and 
disenchantment which political scientists identify as the defining features of the attitudes that 
citizens of contemporary advanced industrial democracies manifest towards their elected 
officials.40 Secondly, and no less crucially, campaign spending may also appeal to those citizens 
who hold unpopular or under-represented political views, by enabling them to obtain a fair and 
respectful hearing for their beliefs and positions in public. In so doing, the sort of affirmation for 
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political preferences that recourse to campaign spending facilitates can serve to enhance the 
political standing of citizens with preferences that are in the minority of mainstream opinion, 
thereby contributing considerably to the enhancement of the legitimacy of democratic 
government – understood both in normative and sociological senses of the term.41 
 The appeal of the informational and influence-based conceptions is not limited 
exclusively to the manner in which they help to organize views on the importance of campaign 
spending. Rather, the dominance that these conceptions have exerted over scholarly as well as 
public debates concerning campaign spending can be attributed, in large part, to the easily 
comprehensible policy proposals that they support. Thus, those who subscribe to the 
informational account of campaign finance often (though not always) tend to be leery of 
regulations which impose restrictions upon the amounts that citizens – acting independently or in 
concert – can spend on campaigns.42 Restrictions of this sort, proponents of the informational 
conception fear, may undermine the educative and empowering potential inherent in electoral 
campaigns by reducing the quantum of information that voters are exposed to. For their part, 
adherents of the influence-based conception are far more accepting of spending limits upon 
campaign expenditures. For these adherents, spending restrictions are critical means by which 
the ability of the wealthy and the politically well-connected to monopolize the attention of 
elected representatives may be curtailed. Restrictions of this sort can achieve this end either by 
undermining the capacity of spenders for engendering gratitude on the part of their beneficiaries, 
or by limiting the extent to which they can “dominate” campaign discourse and hence “drown 
out” the voices of citizens of more ordinary means.43 Restrictions upon the amounts that may be 
spent on campaigns are thus, for proponents of the influence-based view, essential to 
safeguarding the ability of ordinary citizens to ensure that governmental decision-making 
remains responsive to their interests and concerns. 
 The foregoing account, by providing grounds for treating the informational and 
influence-based conceptions of the importance of campaign spending with skepticism, 
undermines the respective regulatory approaches that their adherents endorse as well. Happily, 
for our present purposes, the affirmational account of campaign finance is entirely consistent 
with a third form of regulatory approach – one which privileges the building of floors which 
enhance the ability of citizens of ordinary means to engage in campaign spending instead of 
emphasizing the importance of placing ceilings on the amounts that the wealthy and the well-
connected may spend on elections.44 There are two inter-connected reasons for why this strategy 
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of building floors is congenial to the affirmational argument for the importance of campaign 
finance. In the first instance, the affirmational value identified above can be realized only 
partially by an unregulated market in campaign spending of the sort that proponents of the 
informational conception support. The huge disparities in income which characterize the 
American polity, combined with the high costs associated with purchasing airtime and engaging 
in mass mobilization, ensure that only a tiny proportion of Americans can obtain the 
affirmational benefits of campaign spending in the absence of any regulation of the campaign 
finance regime. Imposing strict restrictions upon the amounts that citizens may spend in support 
of electoral activity along the lines proposed by those who rely on the influence-based 
conception, however, does not help overcome this problem. Rather, the adoption of low 
campaign contribution and independent expenditure limits may in fact diminish the affirmational 
potential inherent in such spending by reducing the ability of all Americans – regardless of 
income, political interest, and partisan commitment – to strive to attain democratic legitimacy for 
the candidates, causes, or parties which they favor. It follows, therefore, that a regulatory regime 
which focuses its attention on enhancing the ability of ordinary citizens to participate in 
campaign spending alone can enable these citizens to obtain affirmation for their political 
preferences in a meaningful manner. Regrettably, the question of how a regime of this sort may 
be designed is one which must, in the interests of time and space, be left to be answered at a later 
moment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dennis Thompson, Political Ethics and Public Office (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), 114-
117; and Joel Fleishmen and Pope McCorkle, “Level-Up Rather Than Level-Down: Towards a New Theory of 
Campaign Finance Reform,” Journal of Law and Politics 1 (1983): 211-285. 
